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Introduction
Asymmetry in the abilities of players in a contest can be found in many situations.
Moreover, players do not always know the abilities of their opponents. For example, in a contest over monopoly regulation, where both the consumers and the producer invest effort in order to influence the decisions of politicians or regulators, it is not always clear how efficient the players are in using their resources. In this particular situation, the ability of consumers to influence politicians is usually known to both groups while the ability of the producer is usually unknown to the consumers. The asymmetry is a result of the fact that the consumers do not know how efficient the producer is in using its resources: do the politicians support or oppose granting monopoly power to the producer; does the producer have direct access to the politicians; do the politicians receive donations from the producer, etc. In this situation, the producer is the informed player since it knows both its own abilities and those of the consumers while the consumers know only their own abilities.
Another example involves an individual claiming compensation from an insurance company following a car accident and an intermediary, such as a court, which will decide whether the individual is to receive compensation. Both parties invest resources in obtaining evidence to prove their case while only the claimant knows his real situation. If the individual has been seriously injured in the accident then it will be easier for him to prove his case since for every unit of resources invested (to prove his case), he will have a higher probability of winning. On the other hand, if he is only lightly injured, it will be harder for him to prove his case and each unit of resources invested will have a lower return. In this case, the information regarding the individual's real state is private and known only to him. 2 In the rentseeking literature, it has been established that asymmetry between the contestants reduces wasteful lobbying efforts. The asymmetry can be in terms of the lobbying capabilities, wealth endowments, attitudes toward risk or rent valuations of the contestants (see, for example, Allard (1988) , Baik (1994) , Nitzan (2002, 2007) , Gradstein (1994) and Nitzan (1994) ).
The analysis of situations in which players value the prizes differently and their values are private information can be found in the economic literature. Nti (1999) 3 allows players to have different values but assumes that they are known. Malueg and Yates (2003) , on the other hand, determine the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a rentseeking contest in which the players' valuations of the prize are private information and determine the conditions under which the equilibrium exists. Wärneryd (2003) considers a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. For settings in which one player knows the value of the prize, while the other knows only its prior distribution, he provides conditions for a situation in which the uninformed agent is ex-ante strictly more likely to win the prize than the informed agent. In the special case of the Tullock contest, equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than when either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. Hurley and Shogren (1998a) consider a model in which players value the stakes differently and there is one-sided private information, i.e. one player does not know the other's value. They investigate how changes in the nature of the one-sided information asymmetry affect investment levels in the contest and show that the results are a function of the level of information uncertainty. In a different paper, Hurley and Shogren (1998b) This paper extends the literature to any size of stakes and compares the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of the one-sided private information contest to the outcomes of a contest in which both players know the abilities of all the players. In our paper we show conditions under which uncertainty increases both the investment of the uninformed player and the contest's rent dissipation. Clark (1997) considers a similar type of question to the one we present and examines a form of the Tullock imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking game in which the contestants are uncertain about the value of a bias parameter in the probability of winning function. Beliefs about this unknown parameter are not constrained to be static. He considers two methods by which the players' prior beliefs on this parameter can be updated. First, he allows for information to emerge by allowing the game to be played twice where the outcome of the first game is known before the second begins. The identity of the winner in the first contest represents information that emerges endogenously and which can be used to revise beliefs on the 4 unknown bias parameter. Second, information can be produced outside the model by an external agency, which gives rise to exogenous learning.
In this paper, we consider a different one-sided private information problem. In the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, one player possesses information regarding his own ability and that of his opponent, while the other player only knows his own ability.
We compare this contest to the case of fully-informed players, where each player knows his own ability and that of his opponent. The comparison is important in understanding to what extent the asymmetry affects the players. Would it be optimal for a central planner to invest resources to reduce the asymmetry between the players in order to minimize the waste of resources or to increase social welfare? In order to answer such questions it is important to compare the outcome under full information with that under information asymmetry. We start by presenting a case in which the informed player's ability can be one of two types and derive conditions under which the uninformed player invests more (or less) effort in the one-sided private information contest than in a complete information contest (Result 1). We also derive conditions under which the expected rent dissipation in a contest with one-sided private information is larger (or smaller) than in a fully-informed contest (Result 2).
While it would appear at first glance that uncertainty may be an advantage to the informed player, we show general conditions under which incomplete information may in fact be harmful to him (Result 3) . Surprisingly, we show that this condition is independent of the probability assigned by the uninformed player to the type of the informed player (or the proportion of each type in the population). Another question that we consider is whether ex-ante the informed player -before knowing his own type -prefers that the uninformed player knows his type and as such will play the game under full information (Result 4). We then turn to considering a two-stage game in which the informed player, in the first stage of the contest, declares his type (or does not declare) and in the second stage the players play according to the information available to them. We show that if the informed player can only tell the truth then the game will turn into a full information contest while if the informed player can lie, then a one-sided private information contest has meaning in this context (Result 5). We generalize Result 3 to allow for the informed player's ability to be any one of N types (Result 6). The generalization enables us to show that in the case where one contestant has the same ability as the uninformed contestant, he will prefer a onesided private information contest (Result 6).
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The model with two possible types of players
We first consider the case in which the informed player's ability may be one of two types and then generalize the results to allow for the informed player's ability to have any one of N possible values.
In this contest, there are two risk-neutral contestants who compete for a given prize.
3 Each contestant has the same valuation of the prize, which is equal to n. The players can have different abilities to translate their efforts into performance. In other words, a unit of effort invested by one player may have a different value in the determination of the winning probability than a unit invested by the other. In a onesided private information contest (i.e. an incomplete-information contest), the game proceeds as follows: 
The solution of this problem, which is presented below in Section 2.2, is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. From this solution, we can derive the investment and expected utility of each player, given the asymmetry between player I and player U. 
A Benchmark: the case of certainty
Consider the case in which each player knows his own ability (i.e. type) and that of his rival. This means that in Stage I, the two players, I and U, know player I's type, as described in the previous section. For simplicity, we continue to use the same notation for the players (I and U) as in the one-sided private information case. In other words, even though both players are fully informed, the notation U will continue to indicate the uninformed player in the one-sided private information case.
Since player I can be one of two types, L or H, the players' expected net payoffs are given by: 4 4 A different way of looking at this situation is by considering that the value of winning for player i is equal to u i , and the value of losing to his opponent, player j, is equal to v j . The expected prize of i is equal to:
, the expected prize can be represented as
is the stake of player i (the real benefit from winning the contest) (see Baik, 1999 , Nti, 1999 and Epstein and Nitzan, 2006a , 2007 . Since v i is a constant, it can be omitted from the calculations.
For player U, i y denotes his investment given the type of player I,
Each player determines his optimal investment in the contest in order to maximize his expected net payoff. Solving the first order conditions, 5 we obtain that the Nash equilibrium investment of the players in the case of complete information is equal to:
Expected rent dissipation is equal to:
e n e y x RD and the expected net payoffs in equilibrium are equal to:
Let us now consider which type of player I, i.e. type L or type H, makes a larger investment in the contest (and accordingly player U makes a larger investment as ), the effect of the rival's effort L(H) on the probability function is lower (higher) than that of the rival U and as a result the intensity of the competition is reduced (note that the intensity of the competition is also reduced in the case of H). Therefore, the two contestants, i. 
One-sided private information
In this case, we examine the game described at the beginning of Section 2, in which both players know player U's type, while only player I knows his own type. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, player U will determine y such that it maximizes his expected net payoff as defined in (2) and player I will maximize his expected net payoff as defined in (3), given his actual type, which is either L or H.
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As we will show, there may be two types of equilibrium. In the first, the effort invested by player L is positive and in the second, it is zero. Let us start with the first case.
Case 1: 
). According to section 2.1, in the case of certainty that
), the efforts of both players (U and L) will be positive, as can be seen from equation (6) 
, then the intensity of competition between players H and U will be relatively low and therefore the effort of player U (and also that of player H) will be relatively low. Thus, it will be worthwhile for player L to invest positive effort. We now turn to describing the efforts of the players in this case.
Solving the first order condition, the investment made by player U will be as follows (see Appendix 1): and the investment made by player I will be equal to: and the expected net payoffs in equilibrium are equal to: ). In this case, according to section 2.1, player U relates to his rival, with a high probability, as player H and therefore he will invest effort that is close to that given by equation (6) 
The expected rent dissipation is equal to:
and the expected net payoffs in equilibrium are: Since in the incomplete information contest player U invests the same amount against either type of player I (L or H) in both of the equilibria, it must be the case that he invests some "average" amount that would have been invested under complete information. Thus,
The expected rent dissipation
By comparing the total expected investment (rent dissipation) in a full information contest to that in a one-sided private information contest, we obtain the following result (see Appendix 3 for proof): 6 The explanation is similar for 1  L H e e .
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Result 2
The expected rent dissipation in a contest with one-sided private information may be greater or smaller than that in a full information contest: If the informed contestant is of type L (H) then the expected rent dissipation will be greater than the rent dissipation in the fully informed contest if and only if
This result has the same flavor as the previous one and is based on the level of asymmetry between the players, i.e. whether the uninformed player is strong or weak.
then L e (relative to H e ) is distant from (and lower than) the value of player U,
). Therefore, under certainty, the intensity of competition will be low and therefore the total efforts of player U and L will be low relative to the total expected efforts of the players U, L and H in the case of uncertainty.
Expected net payoffs
Let us consider the case in which uncertainty may be a disadvantage to player I. In other words, the expected net payoff of player I under one-sided private information will be lower than his expected net payoff under full information. In order for this to be the case, we need to compare the expected net payoff of player I in both cases.
Under certainty, the expected net payoff of player I is a function of his type and is given by equation (9). Under one-sided private information, player I's expected net payoff is given by equations (16), (17) and (22). The condition for player I to be worse off as a result of his opponent (player U) not knowing his type is that his expected utility be higher under full information than under one-sided private information. 7 In order for the situation of one-sided private information to be disadvantageous to the informed player, i.e. player I, it must hold that the expected utility under this condition is smaller than under certainty. The following result is therefore obtained (see Appendix 4 for the proof):
Result 3 L in the one-sided private information contest than in the complete information contest, player L would prefer player U to know his type, which will reduce player U's investment in the contest and increase his own expected net payoff.
At first glance, the first result is surprising since it implies that the preferences of player I (the informed player) for certainty over one-sided private information is independent of the probability assigned by player U to player I's type (or the proportion of each type in the population). In contrast, given the explanation of Result 2, the intuition behind Result 3 part 1 becomes clear. In other words,
and it can be seen that player U invests less effort in a situation of certainty when facing player L than in a situation of uncertainty. This effort is independent of the probability assigned by player U to the type of player I, since player U "averages" his efforts between the two player types (L and H) in a situation of uncertainty. The same type of arguments hold for 1  L H e e and the preference of player H. We can conclude from the above that in the case where player L (H) has either the same ability as player U or is more (less) efficient
), player H (L) would prefer player U to know his type since this will increase the expected net profit of both the informed and the uninformed players.
Ex-ante behavior
In this section, we consider whether player I (before knowing his own type) would exante prefer that the uninformed player (player U) know his type and as such play against him under full information or that he not know his type and play against him under one-sided private information.
When player U knows player I's type, then according to equation (9) the ex-ante expected utility of player I is equal to:
In contrast, when player U does not know player I's type, there are two possibilities for the expected utility of player I:
, then from equations (16) and (17), the ex-ante expected utility of player I equals, 
e e e p e e then from equations (22), the ex-ante expected utility of player I equals:
Player I will prefer ex-ante that player U not know his type if the expressions in (24) and (25) are greater than the expression in (23). Thus, in case 1: 9 Given these insights, we can now explain the following two cases.
Case 1:
We will make use of the following expression:
, we find that its sign is identical to that of the following expression: 9 Since player I (whether he is L or H) could have remained at the same level of investment (which is now non-optimal), which he chose prior to the increase in L P , and to thus increase his probability of winning, since after the increase in L P the investment of player U decreases. It is clear that if player I's probability of winning increases with no change in his investment, his utility increases. Essentially, player I increases his utility even further, since he responds optimally by also changing his investment.
Formally, the signs of in the incomplete information contest player U relates to player I as player L with a higher probability, as in the complete information contest. Therefore, in both contests, the strategies of the two players, L and U, are almost identical and therefore the utility of player L in both cases is as well.
In contrast, if player I knows he is type H, he will prefer that player U does not know his type (part 2 of Result 3: ). Therefore, player U in the incomplete information contest invests almost the same amount as in the complete information contest when facing player L, i.e. (11)), which is lower than in the case where player U knows with certainty that he is facing player H. Therefore, the utility of player H under incomplete information is higher, since player U in this case invests less (since he estimates that he is facing player L with a high probability) relative to under complete information . Therefore, we obtain that ex-ante when moving from complete to incomplete information the "contribution" of player H to the increase in utility is larger than the "contribution" of player L to the decrease in utility. This result is described by expression (28), such that for player H although the probability is lower it is multiplied by the positive difference in utilities (in expression (28), the produce of 3 and 4) and this product "overcomes" that of player L, whose probability is higher but is multiplied by a negligible difference in utilities (in expression (28), the product of 1 and 2).
Case 2:
We make use of the following expression:
which describes the difference in ex-ante utilities of player I between incomplete and complete information in order to explain why it is positive in cases where L P is high, including the case in which 1 
and as in case 1, we obtain that in the move from complete to incomplete information, the "contribution" of player H to the increase in utility is greater than that of player L to the decrease in utility. This is because even though the probability that player I is type H is lower, it is multiplied by a positive gap in utilities (in expression (29), 3 is multiplied by 4) and this product "overcomes" that of player L, for whom the probability is high but it is multiplied by a negligible gap in utilities (in expression (29), 1 is multiplied by 2). , again using expression (28).
As in the explanation of case 1 above, if player I knows he is type L he will prefer that player U does not know who he is (part 2 of Result 3); however, the difference in his utility between the incomplete and complete information contests decreases as L P increases. Moreover, when ) we obtain ex-ante that in the move from incomplete to complete information, the "contribution" of player H to the increase in utility is larger than that of player L to the decrease in utility. This result can be seen in expression (28) where although the probability for player H is lower it is multiplied by a negative utility gap (in expression (28), 3 is multiplied by 4) and this product "overcomes" that of player L, whose probability, even though it is higher, is multiplied by a negligible utility gap (in expression (28), 1 is multiplied by 2). Although for relatively "large" and H e , the utility of player H is higher than that of player L, whether in a complete information contest (equation (9)) or in an incomplete information contest (equations (16) and (17)). In addition, in the move from incomplete to complete information the utility of player H increases and that of L decreases, since U "averages" his investment between the two levels of his investment in complete information (as , we obtain that the ex-ante expected utility of player I in the case of incomplete information is higher than in the case of complete information: 2. From 1, player U will know player I's type with certainty since if player I reveals his type then it must be L and if he does not then it must be H. This is known to player H and as such they will be playing a contest with complete information.
According to the following result, if player I can lie in the second stage of the contest, then claim 2 above is not possible in equilibrium and therefore in the contest described above as a two-stage contest the results under asymmetric information are not redundant.
Result 5
In The idea of revealing one's type is not new. Raith (1996) dealt with a similar problem when he considered the incentive of an oligopolist to share private information regarding stochastic demand or stochastic costs. He presented a general model which encompasses virtually all models of the existing literature on information. Within this overall framework, he shows that in contrast to the apparent inconclusiveness of previous results some simple principles determining the incentives to share information can be deduced. One of the main incentives for firms to exchange information is to improve their information about market conditions, which is valid only as far as information about own demand or cost is involved. The incentives to reveal information are as follows: (1) enabling rivals to acquire better knowledge of their respective profit functions leads to a higher correlation of strategies, the profitability of which is determined by the slope of the reaction curves;
and (2) enabling rivals to acquire better knowledge of one's own profit function is always profitable.
In some sense, our model deals with a similar situation. Revealing one's type may well increase the profitability of the informed player. However, this will only occur if the rival, i.e. the uninformed player, receives true information. If the informed player can lie, the uninformed player will never know if he is telling the truth or not and as such the information will never be revealed.
N possible types of players
We now generalize the results to N possible types of players under an interior equilibrium. Consider the case where, with probability P i, , player I has a valuation of his investment at a level of 
In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, player U will determine y such that it maximizes his expected net payoff as defined in (30) and player I will maximize his expected net payoff as defined in (31) given his actual type, i = 1,2,…,N. In this case, the following result is obtained (see Appendix 7 for proof): These results generalize the findings presented in the previous section of the paper, which provide the general conditions under which the extreme type of player will prefer a game under certainty to a one-sided private information contest. Note that the intuition behind this result is identical to that presented for Result 3 with two players.
Moreover, in the case where one of the individuals may have the same ability as the uninformed contestant, he will prefer a one-sided private information contest. . Under complete information, the intensity of competition is maximized and therefore the efforts of both players (U and A) are the highest relative to the efforts of any other player who competes against U. This is because the intensity of competition between U and any other player whose value is different from 1 would be lower. Thus, under partial information, player U "averages'
his efforts and as a result they are low relative to the maximal effort that he would have invested against player A under complete information. We obtain therefore that player U under incomplete information makes less of an effort and therefore player A's utility is increased.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a Bayesian Nash contest of incomplete information in which contestants have asymmetric abilities and compare it to the results obtained under a complete information framework. The considered case is a situation of onesided private information in which one player knows the abilities of both players while the other only knows his own ability. We first examined the case for two types of ability and then generalized the results to allow for the informed player's ability to be any one of N possible values.
The various outcomes were compared for two diverse situations: common knowledge of players' abilities and one-sided private information. The outcomes examined include the expenditure of the uninformed player, the expected rent dissipation and the expected payoff of the informed player in both types of contests. It was shown that the comparison of these measurements in the two contests depends on the asymmetry condition, i.e., whether the product of the ability coefficients, L e and H e , is greater, smaller or equal to one. Moreover, the results do not depend on the probability assigned by the uninformed player to the type of player he is playing against.
While one would imagine uncertainty to be an advantage for the informed player, we show general conditions under which incomplete information may be harmful to him and will increase the rent dissipation of the contest. More specifically, 
and, after rearranging: In order to calculate the equilibrium strategies, we assume that 0  L x holds in equilibrium, an assumption which will be shown below to indeed hold. Therefore, we
in equations (2) and (3) to obtain the utility of player U and of player I (who is of type H):
13 It can be verified that the second order conditions are satisfied.
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The first order conditions to find 
to obtain:
We will now show that by substituting
and as a result 0
in (A4) to obtain: 
We will show that the denominator in the last term is not positive, thus completing the proof. In other words, we need to show that:
Taking the root of both sides and simplifying yields:
Multiplying both sides by
gives: 
e e e p e e then equilibrium will be at 0
Appendix 2 -Proof of Result 1
Case 1 :
In the case where the informed player is of type L, the investment of the uninformed player under uncertainty ( * * y ) will be smaller than that under certainty ( 
Multiplying both sides by H e , taking the square root and rewriting, we obtain that
. The value of the LHS of the inequality is smaller than 
The expected rent dissipation in the contest with one-sided private information, which is given by equation (14), is greater than that in the case of certainty, which is given by equation (7), if: 
When the player is of type L, the expected rent dissipation in the contest with onesided private information, given by equation (20), is greater than that in the case of certainty, given by equation (7). To prove this, we need to show that: In a similar manner, it can be verified that if the informed player is of type H, the expected rent dissipation in the contest with one-sided private information, given by equation (20), is smaller than that in the case of certainty.
Appendix 4 -Proof of Result 3
Case 1: Dividing both sides by ) 1 ( 
Appendix 5 -Proof of Result 4
Proof of part 1
. We divide the proof into two cases:
The ex-ante utility of player I if player U knows who he is under complete information is given by equation (23) We substitute the expressions (A9) and (A10) in inequality (A8) to obtain: By simplifying the expression in the angle brackets, we obtain: After further simplification: 
e e e p e e ), player I always prefers ex-ante that player U does not know his type . In other words we must prove that inequality (27) is always fulfilled: 
e e e p e p e p Prior to showing that inequality (A13) is always fulfilled, we return to the condition that must be fulfilled in the current case:
We will use this to prove inequality (A13). Inequality (A14), after rearranging terms, is equivalent to the following inequality:
We square both sides to obtain:
We now return to the left side of inequality (A13). Its denominator is identical to the left side of inequality (A15) and therefore we can substitute the denominator of the left side of inequality (A13) with the right side of inequality (A15) to obtain: , it can be seen that a sufficient condition for inequality (A18) to hold is that one of the expressions within the angle brackets be positive and one not be negative, 
The following two conditions can be derived from conditions (A19) and (A20):
Possibility 1 -part 3a
In the same way that inequality (A12) was developed above, we obtain that inequality (A19) is equivalent to: is sufficiently large the conditions will be fulfilled.
Appendix 6 -proof of Result 5 (part 2)
We will show that if player I of type H knows that player U will know his type if he doesn't declare it in the first stage, then he will decide to declare that he is of type L even though he is of type H. It can be seen that Result 6 is derived directly from this last inequality.
